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Professions, Professionalism, and Law
Some Reflections by a Political Economist
History at all tim es d raw s
Strangest consequences from  rem o test cause
-  T.S. Eliot
T hose w ho  can n o t rem e m b e r  history a re  d o o m ed  to  rep ea t it
— G eorge Santayana
The first thing to  d o  is to  fo rm  the com m ittees:
O n e  Secretary will d o  for several com m ittees.
W e d e m a n d  a co m m ittee , a  rep resen ta tive  com m ittee , a 
co m m ittee  o f  investigation 
RESIGN RESIGN RESIGN
-  T .S  Eliot
Do n o t cover u p  the  scars 
. . .  lest it p rove a  hollow ed shell 
A nd lest the  feet o f  n ew  to m  lives 
Sink in voids o f  counterfe iting .
Do n o t swell e a rth ’s b ro k en  skin 
T o  g laie  the  fissures in the  drum .
— W ole Soyinka
I
To presen t a few rem arks on  the legal profession and  the law as perceived by 
econom ists w ould ap p ear relatively easy. It is not. First th e re  is the  prob lem  that 
econom ists are  hardly a h o m ogeneous category (profession?) in ideology, level o f  
abstraction , tim e perspective o r concern  with institutions. To n arrow  the field 
som ew hat one can lim it it to  political econom ists in the classic sense -  those 
concerned  with the  applied reality o f  analysis in actual sociopolitical and  
institutional contexts.
Not even all political econom ists think alike. W hat follows, therefore, is 
som ething o f  a cross betw een points on which a fairly b road  array  o f  political 
econom ists w ould ag ree  and  the w riter's ow n stance with w hich m any o f  them  
would take issue. Hopefully the  con tex t will usually m ake clear which is which.
One problem o f  interdisciplinary or, indeed, intermodel discussions is a tendency 
to engage in “irregular declensions." For example:
• p*ck out key variables 
'  ou tend to oversimplify 
Hr h « crude reductionist.
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or.
I see the reality o f com plex interactions.
It is hard  to see w hat you are driving at.
He can ’t see the wood for the trees.
Yet the inverse o f  this p rob lem  is a gain if all participants can rem ove their noses 
from  the knotholes in their favorite trees and  see the dangers o f  reductionism  
in h eren t in the ir osvn brutal simplifications.
Many political econom ists would perceive the standard  Anglo-Am erican 
sociological m odel o f  professions as an ideological survivor o f  the rationale for the 
m edieval guilds and not as an analysis o f  the d om inan t characteristics o f  any 
profession today. This m ay be unfair, but the “liberal professions” a re  in fact those 
guilds (or specialized sections o f  m onastic o rders if one includes university teachers 
as a profession) which survived because they could adap t to new  political, econom ic 
and  institutional contexts.
Like alm ost all approaches to  know ledge which believe their field includes som e 
general organizing principles, political econom ists do no t tend  to  see m uch m erit 
in leaving any im po rtan t area  entirely  to  its ow n specialists. P lanning is too 
im portan t to be left solely to  p lann ing  technicians (rather ill advisedly usually called 
planners), w ar to generals, the legal profession to  lawyers. U nfortunately, political 
econom ists are  also quite likely to  m ake the ir ow n speciality an  exception: to  see 
econom ists as the  only legitim ate guardians (in the platonic sense) o f  political 
econom y. This exception  should be resisted precisely because the general 
con ten tion  is sound.
II
It is critical to  realize tha t the political econom ist concerned  with p lann ing  o r 
m anpow er uses the w ords “profession” and  “professional” very d ifferendy from  the 
sociologist concerned  with the  sociology o f  professions. Unless this is realized a 
dialogue o f  the d eaf is likely.
By and  large the political econom ist’s approach  to  professions is m uch m o re  akin 
to th a t o f  m anpow er p lanners, adm in istrato rs and  m anagers than  to  tha t o f 
sociologists.
T he key characteristics o f  a profession (or an  identifiable cluster o f  positions using 
high level m anpow er) for h im  norm ally are:
1. specialized com petences;
2. com petences including som e intellectual co m ponen t and  transferable over a 
range  o f related  activities;
3. com petences w hose effective application is critical and  whose practitioner* 
(certainly in te rm s o f  sm all groups and  possibly even o f  individuals) are not easily 
done w ithout o r substituted for, e ith er by m o re  “hom ogeneous” unskilled or 
sem i skilled labor, o r by m em bers o f  a n o th e r  profession;
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4 an em bodim ent o f not inconsiderable am ounts o f  “know ledge capital" in the 
professional person;
5. a range o f activities m any (not necessarily a ll 'o f  which are not easily contro lled  
in a routinized m an n er because o f the natu re  o f  their “product” and the adverse 
effect o f  a ttem pted  standardization on the quality o f  this “ou tpu t”.
“Colleague con tro l” is noticeably absent from  this list. Few political econom ists 
would deny that the pow er and profit positions o f  m em bers o f  a profession differ 
depending  on their patterns o f  organization and relations to em ployers. But even 
few er would see the colleague-oligarchic-corporate contro l division as integral to 
defining a profession as opposed to analyzing its role and  pow er in a particular m ode 
or sub-m ode o f production.
T herefore, the division o f  professionals versus technocrats is one w hich is 
startling to political econom ists. F rom  their perspective lawyers, engineers, 
econom ists, doctors, m anagers and  arm y officers are  all professionals. T hat, o f 
course, does no t imply the absence o f  struggles o r clashes betw een  professions as 
som e do  adap t be tte r to changing sub m odes o f  production and  their institutional 
em bod im en ts (superstructures) o r are  inherently  advantaged o r disadvantaged by 
the  change. But this does m ean  th a t such struggle is am ong  different branches o f 
the  professional sub class no t betw een professionals and  technocrats.
W h eth er professionals have significant general pow er in a m odern  capitalist (or 
socialist) econom ic system and  if so, w hat types o f  pow er subject to  w hat lim its is an 
issue on  w hich there  is little ag reem en t am ong  political econom ists. The ex trem e 
view o f  the technocracy (com]>osed o f  professionals) as an  em erg en t dom inan t class 
— ad um brated (w ith  enthusiasm )by G albraith  in the neo  liberal tradition on the one 
hand, and, w ith alarm , by the intellectual heirs o f  Kautsky and  L uxem bourg  in the 
social dem ocratic  and  M arxian tradition  on the o th e r  -  is no t a m ajority one. The 
o th e r  ex trem e view that the lim ited degree o f  pow er tha t professionals have over 
the ir  ow n rew ards and  working conditions is being  eroded  for m ost by routinizing 
(“deskilling") previously professional posts and  co-opting the rem n an t professionals 
as ju n io r m em bers o f  the (capitalist o r socialist) decision taking coalition is also a 
m inority  one.1
T he tendency to class professionals as petit bourgeois (a tendency, if not a 
term inology, by 110 m eans lim ited to  M arxian o r quasi-M arxian political 
econom ists) is probably best in terp re ted  as based on a recognition  that know ledge 
can be capital and  can be em bodied  in a person. In that sense professionals are  small 
capitalists and  ones w hose capital is critical to the operation  o f  larger 
agglom erations ofiprivate o r state) capital. T hat they can be a dom inan t class on this 
base seem s unlikely* (not incredible) but that they can be a secondary m em b er o f  
alm ost any capitalist, social dem ocratic o r socialist ruling coalition o f  sub classes 
*eems probable. If this is a correct view, then  professions are likely to retain  som e 
ability to define their ow n qualifications, work conditions, areas o f com petence and 
rewards whether the formal structure o f  control is one o f professional autonomy, 
ohr*nch»c or corporate patronage, with or without state mediation.
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III
By and large ]x>!itical econom ists concerned  with institutions and processes would 
not see concepts such as justice as being confined to law or laws. They would see the 
law as em bodying the particu lar concepts o f  justice held  by the dom inan t decision 
takers; and  the individual laws and  legal institutions and  processes as am ong  the 
w'ays in which these concepts w ere m ore  o r less im perfectly articulated, popularized, 
mystified, reproduced  and  enforced.
Tit is is quite different from  saying that political econom ists do  not opet ate on the 
basis o f  som e (adm ittedly highly divergent and  often  implicit) concepts o f  justice. 
Ironically, m any see justice as m ore  inherently  involved in political econom y than  
in law, even if m ore  form ally and  overtly p resen ted  in the la tte r.’ For all bu t a few 
political econom ists, law and  laws a re  perceived as functional and  value em bodying 
ra th e r  than  as philosophical and  integrally m oral.' It is critical to  realize this because 
a law yer’s view o f  jsolitical econom y is often alm ost the inverse and  again the danger 
o f  a dialogue o f  the d ea f arises.
Many political econom ists do no t m ake a distinction betw een  laws and  the law.' 
Indeed, m ost o f  them  it should be said, do not have any articulated  views as to  e ither 
law or laws (w hereas a m ajority do  have som e analytical approach  to  professions 
a n d /o r  high level m anpow er). T he positions sketched, therefore, a re  “m inority” 
ones, albeit fairly typical o f  political econom ists -  including those o f  E uropean 
socialist states -  w ho have devoted  a tten tion  to  the topic.
As a system, law is seen as serving several functions:
1. legitim ation o f  decisions and  avoidance o f  controversy  (political econom ists are 
by and large biased against litigation and  view a m ajor role o f  laws and  lawyers as 
being the avoidance no t simply o f violence but also o f the form alized “violence" o f  
litigation);
2. m obilization o f  resources (including class o r subclass support) for the purposes 
chosen by decision takers and  (presumptively) em bodied  in the legal system;
3. facilitation o f  adm in istration  and  m an ag em en t by setting refe rence  fram es for 
decisions requ iring  judgm ent and  laying dow n procedures for rou tine ones;
4. contro l th rough  sanctioning (w hether by req u irem en t o r prohibition , rew ard  
o r penalty) particu lar classes o f  acts.
To carry ou t these functions the system  m ust possess certain  characteristics:
1. com prehensibility  to  decision takers, practitioners and  those req u ired  (or 
forbidden) to  act. (This does no t m ean  all laws o r all clauses need  to  be 
com prehensib le to  everyone, e.g., if  price contro l is to  be enforced  by “m an  in shop” 
reporting , then  the price schedules and  reporting  procedures, but not necessarily 
the detailed principles and  procedures o f price setting m ust be com prehensib le to 
him);
2. predictability in the sense that legal process or legal process determined 
decisions (in courts but equally by lawyers, managers, administrators acting with 
reference to the legal framework) are largely coherent, compatible with each other
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and co m m en t with legal provisions. (This docs no t exclude discretionary pow ers, 
hut it do rs exclude taking decisions w ithout refe rence  to the legal provisions);
3. i outinizatinn of “decisions” o r actions w hich a re  seen to requ ire  uniform ity  and 
(subject to review provisions) to need  little judgm ent at the initial action level -  for 
exam ple, m any b ranches o f tax assessm ent and  licensing;
4. setting clear lines o f  authority  (including locus o f  discretion and  review) in 
public sector adm inistration , m an ag em en t and  decision taking;
5. m eans to resolve conflict -  preferably by m ethods no t involving form al 
litigation (especially again in the public sector adm in istration , m an ag em en t and  
decision taking fields);
6. d e terrence  o f  undesired  actions (with p rosecution  o f  those w ho act in the 
undesired  ways, seen prim arily as a m eans o f de te rrin g  others).
Political econom ists thus tend  to  be ‘leg a l realists” concerned  with the law in 
action and  perceiving tensions betw een tha t law and  the law on the books as 
rep re sen ting  e ither a failure o f  systemic “discipline” (in M yrdal’s sense o f a “soft 
society") o r a failure to adapt the law to  reflect p resent systemic decision taker goals. 
They are concerned  with how  the law affects “rea l peop le”, “rea l events” and  “real 
decisions” m uch m o re  than  with legal theory (or as som e w ould say in a disparaging 
tone, legal “theology”).
l l i i s  approach  im plies tha t any individual law, legal institution o r legal process 
can and  should be m odified if it becom es even m oderately  dysfunctional from  the 
poin t o f  view o f decision takers, so long, th a t is, as decision taking coalition 
m em bersh ip  does no t change so rapidly and cyclically as to  m ake this a recipe for 
chaos. H ow ever, a t the  m acro  level, m o re  stability is usually seen as desirable 
because rap id  and  repeated  changes in the en tire  legal system (the law as opposed 
to  individual laws) have h igh costs in te rm s o f  its ability to legitim ate, mobilize and  
contro l and  also tend  to  pyram id the difficulties o f  com prehensibility , predictability 
and  action de te rren ce  related  to  even m icro  changes.
Evidently, several criticism s can be m ade o f  this approach  to  analyzing law and 
laws;
1. the division betw een  adm inistrative ru les/p ro ced u res and law is unclear and 
varies from  political econom ist to  political econom ist w ith few clear criteria 
advanced;
2. the in teraction  o f  institutional structures and  practices with m odes o f  
production  and  d om inan t decision taking coalitions is ruthlessly simplified -  often 
to  the poin t o f  crude reductionism ;
3. while law is clearly no t seen as value free in operation , the highly instrum ental 
approach to it tends to conceal the fact tha t legal form s as well as their use have 
em bodied  values and  that, therefore, significant changes in the class na tu re  o f  
decision taking coalitions usually requ ire  changes in legal processes and form s as 
well as in specific laws, crim es, requ irem ents, and  sanctions;
4 . the approach is to som e extent transciisciplinary but it is rarely truly 
interdisciplinary and tends to be economistic.
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Political econom ists are  not particularly given to sim ple “reading ofF  o f the “p roper” 
form  o f institutions and professions from  som e single d om inan t characteristic. They 
do -  no t surprisingly -  tend to view econom ic relations (sub m odes o f production) 
as central and  probably ultim ately decisive bu t are  no t -  as a group -  particularly 
p rone to crude reductionism .
In exam in ing  any set o f  institutions and  relations in any one econom y, m ost 
political econom ists w ould consider the sub m ode o f  production (patterns o f 
production and  ownership), in ternational econom ic relations (dom inance, 
sub central status, periphera l dependence), technology (both in the econom y and  in 
the global system), institutional pa tterns (especially o f  the  state and  o f  the m ajor 
directly productive sectors) and  the history o f  the econom y to  be critical. The 
in teraction  o f  these forces is seen as d e term in ing  possible and im plausible, efficient 
and inefficient (in te rm s o f  d om inan t decision taker o r identified class o r fo rm ation  
goals'), stable o r unstable institutional and  relationship  patterns. Most political 
econom ists w ould con ten t them selves w ith specifying ranges, no t arguing tha t 
there is com plete de term in ism  and  n o  autonom y as to  institutional and  
superstructural pa tterns and  evolutions.
Ideology is no t an  area in which applied political econom ists are  usually very 
articulate o r expert. Presum ably, this is because they opera te  on  largely implicit 
ideological prem ises. C ertainly this characteristic cuts across ideological divides and  
is very evident in m any Socialist European political econom ists. The evident d anger 
is tha t the implicit, u nexam ined  ideology m ay be quite inconsistent w ith the actual 
sub m ode o f  production , place in the in ternationa l econom ic o rder, level o f  
technology, history o r overall superstructure to  which it is applied.
In a “class” state one w ould norm ally  expect to  find “com peting” ideologies. 
Because these are  articulated  by specialized groups m o re  com plex than  sim ple 
econom ic classes, their in teraction  is not subject to an  easy “reading off". Lawyers 
(and for tha t m atte r political econom ists) tend  to set a  h igh value in o rd e r and 
predictability, no  m atte r w hat their b ro ad er (supraprofessional) ideological 
perspectives. This can create  conflict, even in situations far short o f  arm ed  
revolution. In Chile u n d e r Allende lawyers o f  the left tended  to advise the narrow est 
possible action and the  least violation o f  form  in o rd e r  to achieve the goals o f  the 
U nidad Popular, w ithout perceiving that the ir  advocacy o f  cautious 
constitutionalism  was, in m any respects, arguably inconsistent with these goals.
T he sub m ode o f production has m ajor effects on the legal system and  on legally 
tra ined  personnel as to:
1. w hat transactions they are involved in and  in w hat way (as negotiators, advisors, 
adjudicators, o r com batants);
2. how  law and  legally tra ined  personnel are  organized in term s o f  institutions, 
selection and  train ing , relationship  to  o th e r  institutions;
3. which individuals, units, sub classes o r form ations a re  served (or controlled) by 
legad processes and  legally tra ined  personnel;
IV
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4. and -  probably m ost critical -  w hat goals the legal institutions and personnel 
serve and  how  they participate in shaping, articulating and im plem enting  these 
goals.
The im portance -  as perceived by o thers -  o f the legal profession is likely to  turn 
largely on how they relate to the last point. Unless legally tra ined  personnel see “real 
p roblem s” as perceived by “real people”, they a re  likely to  be relegated  to 
increasingly n arrow  areas o f  activity and. especially, to im p lem entation  ra th e r  than  
decision advising o r articulation.
For exam ple, in Tanzania the creation o f  U jam aa (semi socialist) villages was 
perceived by several m em bers o f the judiciary and  the law faculty at the University 
o f Dar es Salaam  as raising problem s. They identified the la tte r as:
1. m eans to acquire land for villages lawfully;
2. form s of secure legal tenu re  for villages over the land they used;
5. legal status for villages especially in respect to  getting  credit and  to installing 
a legal fram e giving the central adm in istration  contro l over village rule setting.
U nfortunately, these w ere no t the problem s as perceived by the President o r the 
C hief Parliam entary  D raftsm an, the Prim e M inister o r the com m ercial and 
investm ent banks, the E conom ic Advisor to  the T reasury o r the villagers. As a result 
the “legal” input both  slowed m ovem en t tow ard  the subsequent legislation on 
village land ten u re  and  village self governm en t and  reduced respect for the legal 
profession as a source o f  advice.'
Land for villages could have been  acquired  quite lawfully under e ith e r  the 
“em in en t d om ain” o r "traditional ten u re” legislation already in force and advice on 
how  to do  so in a less cum bersom e and quicker way m ight have been  useful. Since 
villages de facto held land un d er trad itional “use” tenure, they w ere (and saw 
them selves as) secure, barring  a radical reversal o f  party  policy. As the m ajor credit 
sources w ere public sector financial institutions and  did no t see the presum ptive 
“un reg istered  partn ersh ip ” status o f  m ost villages as a barrie r to lending to them , 
tha t issue was a m a re ’s nest. In the absence o f  clear views on  how  villages could and 
should evolve by village decisions, experience was w anted  before setting guidelines. 
C entral contro l over, o r detailed patterns for, village rule m aking was em phatically 
no t w anted  e ither by villagers o r by party leaders although  m any middle-level 
adm in istrato rs shared  the law yer’s different perceptions on this issue. The advice 
th erefo re  was, and  was perceived as, a distraction from  facing the problem s o f 
creating  and  legislating an  institutional fram ew ork  for m ultipurpose, self-governing 
com m unities and  for their progression by stages from  being fairly standard  local 
governm ental bodies th rough  to becom ing cooperative social and  production units.
V
For those political economists seriously interested in legally trained personnel and 
le^al institutions (a distinct minority*), a key question is “what do legally trained 
pet-«onnel do, “ At least nine areas may exist:
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1. court clash roles in res|>ect to  the crim inal law;
2. clash avoiding roles in respect to  the crim inal law (advisory, plea bargaining, 
educational, etc.);
3. court clash roles in respect to  the civil law;
4. clash avoiding roles in respect to the civil law;
5. m anagerial, organizational and  adm inistrative roles (beyond purely legal 
system adm inistration) w he th er traditionally “legal” o r not;
6. negotiating  roles in respect to  transactions, contracts, etc.;
7. institution creation  roles: for exam ple, the contribu tion  o f  the C hief 
Parliam entary  D raftsm an to the articulation  o f  the decision taking fram ew ork, 
procedures and  en fo rcem en t provisions o f  the Tanzania Prices Act;
8. institution validation roles: for exam ple, the p ream ble  and  the public 
presen tation  o f prices, public repo rting  and  sj>ecial evidential provisions o f  the sam e 
Act;
9. institutional system validation roles: for exam ple, the Tanzanian  legislation to 
enforce the Leadership  Code (which barred  public office ho lders from  engaging in 
private business); to  establish in law the already existing policy m aking suprem acy 
o f party  institutions; and  to create  a clear fram ew ork  for a series o f  decentralized 
self governm ent Itodies from  the village to the national level.
The traditional em phasis o f  the legal progession (shared by m any social scientists 
studying law and  lawyers) on the first four roles is alm ost the inverse o f  the 
concerned  political econom ist’s. At the m icro level he is likely to be m ost concerned  
with the fifth and  sixth and  at the sectoral and  m acro  levels w ith the last three.
These areas -  except perhaps n eg o tia tio n —are  h a rd e r  to study than  the first four. 
By their na tu re  they do not th row  up public records and  by the n a tu re  o f  state 
bureaucracies they tend  to be  shrouded  in secrecy. H ow ever, bo th  qualitatively and 
even in som e cases quantitatively ,' such roles are  often  m o re  critical than  the 
traditionally  studied ones in the sense o f being  m o re  closely related  to key decisions 
and  to significant changes in the institutional structures, social relationships, and  the 
sub m odes o f  econom ic production. A drafting  section w hich is m ore  than  just a 
‘legal translation  service” can have an  im pact d ifferent in kind from  any n u m b er 
o f  prosecutors, defense lawyers and  m agistrates dealing w ith rou tine crim inal 
offenses.
Q uestions o f  diversification and  specialization are o f  in terest to  the political 
econom ist bo th  as analyst and  as advisor. T he req u irem en ts  in te rm s o f  form al legal 
education for d ifferent legal roles -  e.g., m agistrates, nego tiato rs with transnational 
corporations, parliam entary  draftsm en  and  m anagers, part o f  whose functions 
m ake use o f legal tra in ing  -  w ould ap p ear to be ra th e r  d ifferent. Certainly in some 
states like Tanzania, distinct specialization seem s to be developing in w ork and in 
post em ploym ent training, albeit to date  to  a m uch  lesser ex ten t a t the  law school 
level.
Diversification is related to specialization. The greater the diversity in legal role* 
the less the likelihood that a “general practitioner” can fill ail o f  them. At leas* k w  
aspects o f diversification can be identified:
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1 provision d f traditionnl lrc  il services to  non  trad itional u sers(lrgal aid o r o th er 
fot m s o f  b roaden ing  “access’'1;
2. provision o f  som e elem ents o f legal education  (not m erely those relating  to the 
standai d crim inal/civ il roles o f the bar -  though  not necessarily excluding these) for 
non legal professionals (such as m anagers, negotiators, engineers, econom ists) a t 
university a n d /o r  post em ploym ent course levels;
3. creation  o f new  technically com plex legal services to  m eet new  needs, for 
exam ple, in respect o f negotiations with transnational corporations;
4. creation  o f new , broatl based legal (or paralegal) services, for exam ple, in 
suppoit o f  participation  or com m unity  self governm ent.
Analysis o f  the need  for diversification requ ires a tten tion  to Ixith the qualitative 
and  the quantita tive n a tu re  o f the u n m et o r potential dem an d  but it requ ires m ore  
than  that. It is also necessary to  assess to  w hom  the  “gap" is critical, why it is no t m et 
by legally tra ined  personnel, w hat substitutes for legally tra ined  personnel a re  being 
used (if any), w hat the  consequences (in socioqtolitical and  political econom ic m ore  
than  in form al legal term s) o f  the gap are. F urther, it is critical to  consider w h eth er 
the diversification can o r should be carried  out th rough  “s tandard” legal institutions 
ans using “standard” legal professionals o r w h e th e r  m odifications and 
transform ations are  appropriate .
Paraprofessional is a te rm  subject to  abuse. It should not m ean  in ferio r o r 
sub professional (the abusive connota tion  given to  it by th rea ten ed  professionals). 
Equally it should rarely (and law seem s unlikely to  be an  exception) be viewed e ither 
as a total substitute for professionals in all roles o r as the creation  o f  a hom ogeneous 
cadre. For exatfiple, a political econom ist, w ith n o  fo rm al legal training, but a good 
deal o f  self teaching and  experience acquired  by w orking with legal professionals, 
w ho acts as a consultant to  a d raftsm an , is probably a legal paraprofessional. But he 
is n e ith er a sub professional, a substitute for the d raftsm an  n o r a typical exam ple o f  
a legal paraprofessional.
Paraprofessionals a re  likely to  have to  fill qu ite  particular roles. Because these 
typically m ay range over several d ifferent areas -  for exam ple, negotiating  with 
transnational corpora tions and  advising draftsm en  on substantively com plex 
legislation, and  for a n o th e r exam ple, resolving com m unity  level disputes and  
represen ta tion  before prim ary  courts (w here this is barred  to  lawyers by law, 
econom ic reality a n d /o r  the n u m b er o f  lawyers) — so too should the 
paraprofessional’s education , recru itm en t, institutional position and  m eans o f  
rem u n era tio n  differ accordingly. Probably the m ajor needs for paraprofessionals 
fall in to  tw o broad  categories: on the one hand, highly specialized professionals, part 
o f  whose train ing  is legal; and  on the o ther, individuals serving in a fram ew ork o f  
institutions designed to  fu rther participation, com m unity  self governm ent and  the 
simple and  equ itable resolution o f  conflicts.
Clearly the d em and  -  if any -  for legal paraprofessionals will depend on  the 
nature  o f  the m ode o f  production, dom inan t decision taking coalition,1* and  o f  the 
su te  fram ew ork. A lm ost equally clearly their effective in troduction and use will 
requ ire  significant institutional and procedural changes not lim ited to the legal field.
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F o t  exam ple, in Tanzania there  are distinct village and  w ard level medical 
paraprofessionals; several types o f  district and  regional m edical personnel w ho are 
either new  professionals or(by traditional m edical standards) paraprofessionals; and 
a num b er o f  types o f  m ajor hospital, research  and  educational institution based 
m edical professionals. These o pera te  th rough a variety oflzoth specialized and  mass, 
form al and inform al educational p rogram s, hospitals, ou tpatien t centers, 
dispensaries, consulting places, public health  cam paigns, research  program s; with 
a corresponding variety o f  institutional structures. These are in tended  to m eet basic 
h u m an  needs, bo th  for preventative and  curative m edicine, and  o th er things like 
pure w ater, nutrition  and  env ironm en ta l sanitation; and  to  do  so w ithin a context 
o f  broad, popular participation  in the taking and  carrying out o f  decisions.
In the Tanzanian  con tex t an  ap p ropria te  pa tte rn  for legal and  paralegal 
institutions, tra in ing  and  personnel m igh t be sim ilar to  this in b road  outline with 
com m unal conciliation and  equitable adjudication procedures m anned  by 
part tim e paraprofessionals" at the m ass level; and  a variety o f  specialized 
institutions and  personnel a t the  national end  o f  the spectrum . C om plex issues o f 
articulation will arise: o f  the ro le o f  assessors o r ju ro rs tw h o h av e  recently been  given 
m ore  pow er relative to  m agistrates in prim ary  courts); o f  rep resen ta tion  for parties 
in disputes (now b arre d  except for the state at p rim ary  court level and  lim ited to 
lawyers, again excep t for the  state, at o th e r  levels); o f  the app ropria te  ro le o f  
specialized quasi judicial tribunals (which have m ultiplied at the expense o f  low er 
court jurisdiction, though  appellate jurisdiction has usually rem ained  with the High 
Court); and  o f  the p ro p e r scope for appeals against the  discretionary decisions o f  
officials, m inisters and  individual party  office ho lders to  judicial, conciliation o r 
o m budsm an  type bodies (the last does exist in Tanzania but in practice does not 
reach  m ost w orkers and  peasants). But in the  T anzanian  context, one particular 
ideological fram ew ork  w ithin w hich to  grapple w ith such individually diverse 
questions can be identified.
By contrast, in a country such as Kenya, with a centralizing state, dom inated  by 
a coalition o f  dom estic capitalist and  professional sub classes, and  with a g row th 
strategy keyed to  in tegra tion  in to  transnational capitalism  as a regional sub cen ter, 
a quite d ifferent set o f  constrain ts and  questions w ould be appropriate: if, that is, one 
is talking o f  change w ithin the  p resen t system  and  no t o f  the  req u irem en ts  o f  a 
different decision taking coalition with a d ifferent d evelopm ent strategy introduced 
after a revolutionary change in the system. N evertheless, th e re  are  som e types of 
paralegal institutions and  personnel w hich w ould be consistent with the present 
Kenyan system: including perhaps som e type o f  conciliation service at the 
com m unity  level; and  certainly including personnel w ith the  righ t com bination  of 
legal an d  econom ic skills for nego tiating  with transnational corporations. The 
Kenya p a tte rn  answ ers are  likely to  be o f  relevance m o re  in T hird  W orld states than 
those relevan t to  T anzania w ould be.
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The presentation  o f  som e o f  the ways in w hich jxilitical econom ists m ay look at law, 
legally trained personnel and the legal profession does not imply that o th er ways o f 
looking at these areas are inaccurate; nor even that all elem ents in any (let a lone all) 
political econom ic approaches are sound. Political econom ists are too p rone to 
taking the standard  court and bar cen tered  roles o f law and lawyers as being useful 
-  like say those o f dustm en  -  but also o f perceiving them  as ne ith er central no r a 
useful area  for analysis. Equally, their tendency to  say that both  the standard  
Anglo A m erican sociological and the standard  lawyers’ m odels o f  professions are 
reductionist and exclude alm ost everything tha t is genuinely significant about 
professions (as political econom ists define them), is in itself a form  o f reductionism . 
Finally, the use o f  the econom ic structure and  production relations (sub m ode o f 
production) as the starting  point for the analysis o f  law an d  legal systems does incline 
tow ard  an  unduly m echanistic view o f law as som eth ing  to be “read  o f f  o r to  an 
unduly cynical view o f  law as pure m ystification designed to conceal the nakedness 
o f  econom ic jiow er as exercised o r m ediated  th rough  the state.
T hese are  no t trivial criticism s (nor does the au th o r claim  to  be im m une from  
th em  simply because he sees the  dangers) and  they do point to the need  for 
approaches from  m ultiple starting  points. R a ther m o re  constructively it can be 
n o ted  tha t each o f  these weaknesses in political econom ic approach  flows from  a 
s treng th  in tackling areas no t central to, o r not very satisfactorily analyzed in, legal 
w riting on law or in m uch  o f  the o th er social sciences’ study o f  law. These include 
the critical functions o f  legally tra ined  personnel in roles o th e r  than  court com bat; 
the  characteristics o f  professions an d  clusters o f  high level m anpow er in 
technologically advanced capitalist and  socialist m odes o f  production; the necessity 
o f  relating  study o f  the  law and  legal system to  the underlying econom ic 
relationships.
Notes
1. T he  “deskilling” debate  itse lf is confused. O n the  one h an d  deskilling is seen  as reducing  the average 
level o f  labor skill and  th erefo re  as a m eans o f  increasing capitalist con trohe.g ., by Palloix). In this version 
th ere  seem s to  be som e confusion as to  w hat skill m eans -  in at least the  technical sense to a rg u e  that 
even present unskilled w orkers have low er levels o f  skill th an  m edieval peasants o r  die bulk o f  early 
industrial revolu tion  m ine an d  mill w orkers appears to be  em pirically unsound. Equally, to  argue that the 
factory w orker today is less free and  m o re  at risk than  die  peasant fa rm er is som ew hat m isleading -  m o re  
contro lled  by h u m an  institutional fram es and  m o re  subject to m an  im posed  constra in ts  would ap p ear 
a better stating o f  the situation. T he rever se assertion that “deskilling” (deprofessionuation) is critical to 
fcbrrate fe g . by Dlich and  in a m uch subtler and  m o re  m odu lated  form  by C hairm an  M ao' starts from  
the prem ise that th ere  is an existing o r  potential d o m in an t professional class against w hose 
■*onr^r4iLatxm o f know ledge “deskilling" is a m eans o f  struggle
1 officers m ay be an  excepoon  because they do  have access to  the pow er o f  the  gun as well as
^  I-1 * H ow ever, the  rrabry  o f  pow rT  d u trd x iu o n  under military reg im es is not sample M any a i r
Professions, Professionalism  a n d  the Lore
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arguably d o m in a ted  by (lasses (sub-classes) o ther th an  the  arm y officers them selves o r  rep resen t an 
a ttem p t by the officers to  transfo rm  th em se b es  in to  a capitalist class.
5 T he adocates of “value free" econom ic “science" are  not norm ally political econom ists and even when 
they a r c - f o r  exam ple , M ilton F t ie d rn a n - te n d  to  reject die title. Nor are  their form ulations in fact value 
free but th a t is a different issue.
4 This is an exam ple  o f  “irregular declensions" It is rem arkably  easy for any discipline, profession or 
vantage point for analyzing and  ordering  reality to  yierceive itself as central, value d e te rm in ing  and  able 
to  develop and  p ro p o u n d  tru th  and  to  view all o thers as secondary, functional and  apt only for serving 
an d  enforcing
5. This is not usually the  sam e as the JcfTersonian distinction be tw een  law and  m en  or natural and 
m an  m ade law. In any event, Jefferson  was not so naively com placen t as som e critics a s s u m e -h e  believed 
an  a rm ed  revolu tion  every decade necessary to  a tta in  a renew ed  institu tional synthesis, a view m ore  a 
fo re ru n n e r o f  C hairm an  M ao th an  o f  M ilton F riedm an
6 True, neo  liberal and  n eo  K enynesian political econom ists  are  p ro n e  to s |>eakof the national interest. 
This is e ither a d rfen se  o f  the  status quo (m ore accurately the  existing tra jectory o f  change in the  ¡talus 
quo) o r  an  assertion  that th ere  a re  issues o n  w hich som e consensus am o n g  relevant (i.e., powerful) 
form ations o r  classes is possible. T he  m o re  specific the  analysis, the  less likely a re  such generalizations 
and  the m o re  frequen t ex am inations o f  sjiecilic su bc lass o r  fo rm ation  (how ever tilled) in terests and  aims.
7. True, a case can lie m ade  that the UP had  no  o p tion  but to seek to  set in m otion  an  irreversible process 
o f  change by using clearly lawful m eans. W ith su p p o rt by about h a lf  the  electorate, no  con tro l over the 
legislative o r  judicial b ran ch es  an d  w ith foreign enem ies w aiting to  insert w edges in any cracks which 
opened, it m ay n o t have b een  in any position to  be m o re  radical in its a ttitu d e  to  laws, legal processes 
and  the legal system. T he  point is that m ost radical law yers apparen tly  did not even  consider m o re  radical 
options lierati.se they w ere ru lrd  ou t by their “professional" ideology.
8. The judiciary's tendency  to  defer all cases line die h ad  s im ilar effects. T hat lactic n e ith er u nderscored  
a need  to  revise laws n o r did anyth ing  to  enhance  anybody's respect for the  law o r legally tra ined  
personnel.
9. In Tanzania the  private b a r is probably alx tu t o n e  sixth oflegally  tra ined  personnel. The State Legal 
C orporation , A ttorney G eneral's C ham liers, law school, legal advisors o r  technocrats  in o th er  institutions 
(e.g., in revenue and  the  ex terna l finance division o f  Treasury) an d  legally tra in ed  m anagers and 
adm in istrato rs in roles no t overdy “legal" in any trad itional sense encom pass at least tw ice as many.
10. G ran ted  that if  o n e  is thinking o f  a liberation  m o v em en t (e.g., SW APO in respect o f  Nam ibia), o f  
a  co u n ter legal system  (e.g., the  transitory  “peoples courts” in Portugal) o r  o f  a  ru ral parallel system  w hich 
is n e ith er lawful n o r unlaw ful, n e ith e r positively o r  negatively sanctioned  by the  state, th en  the reference 
group  o f  decision takers changes. But it is still critical to  re la te  to  some set o f  decision takers’ goals (e.g., 
SW APO's Congress o r  Executive, Portugese sharecroppers; an  isolated peasan t com m unity).
11. N ow partly  bu t n o t com pletely  satisfactorily prov ided  by party  units.
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